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THEORIES OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANISATION AND 
COMPETITION POLICY: WHAT ARE THE LINKS? 
ABSTRACT 
The "new industrial ·organisation" enshrined in game theory has elaborated important 
concepts, models and typologies that reveal the richness of corporate conduct. To some 
extent, these developments have improved the quality of analyses in European antitrust 
policy. Three illustrations are considered in the paper: concerted practices, cooperative R&D 
and mergers. However, the new dimensions to be taken into account are very complex and 
sensitive, and the information that antitrust authorities possess is often inadequate to permit a 
full-blown analysis. Adopting a simpler approach, which combines "science" and pragmatism 
relying on presumptions and shortcuts, is inevitable. 

Introduction 
At its most basic level, the aim of scientific activity is the comprehension of our world. 
Theories should be judged by how well they enable us to organise and understand our 
observations. This is especially true in the domain of industrial organisation, where theory 
should provide a framework within which empirical research can be carried out. 
The first part of this paper presents the evolution of the analyses developed in the field of 
"industrial organisation" which has influenced criteria used in competition policy. 
As we shall see, the shift from the linear "structure-conduct-performance" paradigm, primarily · 
empirically based, to the "new industrial organisation" enshrined in game theory, has 
improved the quality of analyses in antitrust, but at a price. However, a reconciliation of the 
two approaches is currently both possible and desirable. 
The second part of the paper examines several market conducts that affect competition and for 
which European antitrust policy is expected to use criteria developed by old and new analyses 
in industrial organisation. Three illustrations will be considered: concerted practices and 
parallelism of actions, cooperative R&D and cartel, mergers and efficiency defense. The first 
of these demonstrates the emerging influence of contemporary developments in economics; 
the cooperative R&D illustration provides an example of lax use of the efficiency defence; 
conversely, the merger Regulation illustrates a strict approach, along with its dangers. 
I. Industrial Organisation and the characterisation of a market. 
Market analysis, either from the point of view of the firm that operates or desires to 
operate in it, or from the viewpoint of the public authorities, requires proper 
characterization. 
The principal objective of industrial organisation has been precisely to provide this 
characterization, resorting to a scheme that relates the market structure with the behaviour 
of the economic agents who operate in it and with the performances that such a relation 
generates. Whether we refer to a manager of a firm or to a public authority responsible 
for antitrust policy, the fundamental problems are analogous. 
At the level of market structure, industrial organisation examines the number of 
competitors who operate in the relevant market and the distribution of market shares, the 
conditions of entry and exit, product standardization and its proximity to substitutable 
goods, the interdependence between upstream and downstream activities, the quality of 
information controlled by partners and the degree of risk involved. 
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As far as conducts are concerned, it should determine the respective role of price and 
non-price strategies, the-level of cooperation which has been established over time among 
the various agents and the use of strategies of differentiation and diversification. 
Finally, through the examination of performances - which deals with the allocation of 
resources or with actual profitability - the results obtained are evaluated. 
A study so conceived that deals with structure, conduct and performances should, then, be 
able to provide an answer to a fundamental question: Which type of competition exists in 
this market? 
The sense of the question varies according to who asks it. In the view of public 
authorities, the intention is to determine if the spontaneous forces of competition which 
characterize the market in question can or cannot lead to an efficient allocation of 
resources and a socially acceptable distribution of income. 
However, from the firm's point of view, what counts is knowing if its own actual or 
potential relative position benefits sufficiently from market imperfections, in order to 
yield substantial and sustainable profits. 
The many studies of industrial organisation have applied a useful filter to this matter, 
permitting the identification and classification of some complex competitive phenomena 
of our industrial society. They have conferred substance to the famous "empty box" of 
traditional microeconomic analysis. 
Nevertheless, until the sixties for the most part, a dangerously reductive approach was 
adopted. -It is worthwhile underlining at. least two limits of the traditional industrial 
organization economics, one of a theoretical nature and the other of an empirical nature. 
On the theoretical ground, the analysis was seldom made in the context· of a precise 
microeconomic model and rarely has the type of oligopolistic interdependence been made 
explicit. On the contrary, the accent has been placed on the description of the market 
structure and its direct links with the performances achieved. 
From this viewpoint, industrial organisation is a model in which change is treated as 
exogenous and where behaviour and performance are structurally determined. It is also a 
static system (or rather a comparative static one) that does not take into account that 
competition is an evolving and historic process with possibilities of retroactions, going, 
for instance, from performance to behaviour and from behaviour to certain structures that 
thus become endogenous. 
On the empirical level, two types of study characterize the traditional outlook: case 
studies and econometric studies. Case studies, which were particularly prolific in the 
1960s, have provided a better understanding of some industries and of some markets. 
• 
The consideration of qualitative aspects has clarified the complexity of industrial reality, 
whereas quantitative measures, such as the degree of concentration or the profit rate, have 
provided simple summary indicators of the observed situation. These case studies, 
however, have not given rise to much hope that a general outline can be made and further 
developed. 
After the 1960s econometric studies increased and set themselves the task of going 
beyond the limit of case studies by finding statistically significant links between some 
indicators of performance, such a the profit rate, and a whole set of indicators of market 
structure, iri particular, the degree of concentration. These regressions have been based 
on cross ·sections of industries. Their objective is essentially to test simple hypotheses, 
possibly applicable to all markets, such as the existence of a linear relationship between 
the degree of concentration and the rate of profit in the industry. The theoretical 
arguments that are used to include or exclude a particular structural aspect from a list of 
explanatory variables are often ad hoe, made without clear reference to an underlying 
general model of which the tested equation is the reduced form. Moreover, the 
interpretation is a causal one - ceteris paribus, a high degree of concentration should 
result in a higher rate of profit - rather than an equilibrium relationship. The 
corresponding usual interpretation is the presence of m~ket power in concentrated 
markets. 
2. What has come to be known as the "new industrial organisation" presents innovative 
methodological aspects. Moreover, on the basis of a more technical analysis, it has 
relaunched the eternal debate between those who see in our industrial economies an 
efficient adaptation to external conditions and those who see a search for market power 
(see Jacquemin, 1987). 
Compared with earlier studies, recent research is increasingly using tools of 
microeconomic theory, models of imperfect competition, and game theory. Going 
beyond the extreme cases of perfect competition and monopoly, solution concepts grow 
in number. Oligopolistic interdependence has been explored by cooperative games as 
well as .by models of noncooperative behaviour. Furthermore, dynamics in industrial 
structure have come to replace static approaches. Schumpeter (1950) has already stressed 
the intertemporal framework within which the competitive process should be placed. 
We must assume that economic agents are making sequential decisions and taking into 
account the consequences of their actions on the subsequent evolution of industrial 
activity. Firms do not merely react to given external conditions, but try to strategically 
shape their economic environment by modifying, in a credible manner, market structure 
and market conducts of competitors. Then, the unidirectional causality, from structure 
through conduct to performance, breaks. For example, we have seen that, in the "old 
industrial organisation", super-normal profits in an industry would be associated with 
collusive behaviour brought about by high concentration possibly due to exogenous 
barriers to entry. 
In the new approach, the number of firms is determined endogenously and depends on the 
type of game being played by firms, defined in terms of choice variables (price, quantity 
and so on), timing of decision, number of replications of the game (Norman and 
La Manna, 1992). This approach also allows for the fact that buyers and sellers do not 
have a perfect knowledge of their partners or adversaries, their preferences, and their 
means. Situations of incomplete and asymmetric information are treated differently, and 
new concepts of equilibrium are again developed. 
3. A result of the new approach has been a proliferation of models, according to the choice 
o.f the strategy space, the firms' beliefs, the possibility of commitments, the temporal 
horizon, the attitude toward risk and asymmetries arising at each stage of the decision 
process. 
Several implications derive from these theoretical enrichments. 
The first is that the corresponding behaviours derived as optimal strategies at equilibrium 
demand high and growing levels of rationality. 
Furthermore, the number of possible equilibria for a given structure is generally large. 
A third aspect is that the solutions are not robust, for they are very sensitive to slight 
modifications in assumed initial conditions. At the very limit, any possible outcome can 
be rationalized, in particular by playing with information conditions. 
In such a situation, economic experts involved in antitrust act~ons have a wide open field 
to attack or justify a giveri practice. "Give me a result, I shall give you a theorem"! 
This explains recent criticisms made against the ( ab) use of game theory. 
According to P. Milgrom and J. Roberts (1988, p. 450), "in the economics of 
organization... the vast bulk of the research has been primarily deductive theorizing. ... 
Too often the questions that the latest paper seeks to answer arise not from consideration 
of puzzling aspects of observed practices... but from the desire to extend the analysis in 
an earlier paper that, in turn, may have been only tenuously connected to observation. " 
These criticisms are important but must not imply throwing out the baby with the bath 
water. 
What the rich panoply ·of possible models requires is a new combination of theoretical 
and empirical analyses. Rather than looking for the model which permits simple 
generalizations that can be applied to most industries, as previous authors would have 
liked, we must develop a menu of theoretical models from which the best adapted model 
to the market under study can be selected. On this basis, different views have been 
expressed. According to F. Fisher (1989, p. 119), "the role of a generalizing theory is to 
tell us ... how conduct and performance depend upon structure ... It may very well be the 
case that one cannot understand the history of the American rubber tire industry without 
knowing that Harvey Firestone was an aggressive guy who believed in cutting prices ... 
The job of theory is to discover what characteristics of the rubber tire industry made such 
aggressive behaviour a likely successful strategy. " But he adds: "That question would be 
answered if we had a generalizing theory of oligopoly". The following comment of 
S. Martin (1993, p. 564) is pertinent: "A theoretical model tailored to the specific 
characteristics of the American rubber tire industry would answer the same question. 
Quite likely, it would supply the answer with greater clarity". Contrary to monism, 
eclecticism is paradoxically close to the concern of losing, as a result of modeling, the 
qualitative richness of the information supplied by specific case studies of industry and 
markets. 
Monism and eclecticism may in fact be complementary, in the sense that the model can 
be adapted to the major observed features of the industry. Beyond this, a richer typology 
of behaviour can be made to correspond to appropriate models. Indeed an important 
function of game theory is the classification of the multiple interactive decision 
situations. Just making the classification is already a form of science. "The right 
classification is often the key to a successful theory. Modern biology was made possible 
by Linnaeus's classification of all living things into species and genera." (R. Aumann, 
1985, p. 39).1 
By the same token, econometric studies based on inter-industry cross sections which is 
plagued by many problems of interpretation have been complemented by time series 
analyses of industry on the one hand and by intra-industrial comparisons on the other. 
Heterogeneity of economic agents, of their performance, and their strategies within the 
same industry can then be tested. More generally, game theory must be completed by 
description of decision behaviour and empirical support. According to M. Shubik (1985), 
"Game - theoretic solution - concepts should be judged and understood in terms of the 
quality and quantity of their applications;" Neither theory nor empirics can stand alone, 
at least as regards the analysis of real-world industries. 
From that point of view, the field of competition policy is a particularly important 
laboratory. It shows that competition policy must rely on sounder theoretical 
characterization than in the past but, simultaneously, that the diversity of models and 
results requires a case-by-case approach where insights into the ways firms acquire and 
maintain positions of market power become essential. 
1 Aumann also writes that "it is somewhat surprising that our disciplines have any relation at all to real 
behaviour"! 
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II. The use of industrial organisation in European competition policy: some 
illustrations. 
Differences in attitude and legislation about cartels and monopolies are evident from 
country to country. Several factors play a role. For example, contrary to large 
economies, small developed open economies having weak effects on the prices of traded 
goods maximize their real income level by a policy of free trade; and in this situation 
antitrust policy is not usually important given that international trade provides an 
effective source of discipline on market performance. In developing countries, on the 
other hand, the infant industry argument is often used for justifying protection against 
imports as well as the adoption of various forms of regulation restricting competition at 
home. 
More profoundly, there are differences in attitudes toward economic power (private or 
public), freedom of contract and trade, efficiency and equity, that are grounded in 
dissimilarities in political, cultural and moral history, what C. Edwards (1967) calls the 
"cultural inheritance". For a long time in Europe, though competition has been 
considered desirable, it has not been accepted as an automatic selective device by which 
the fittest survive. Instead emphasis was put on the moral obligation in economic affairs: 
competition has to be fair. The predominant American view on the contrary has relied 
upon the interplay of selfish motives in competitive markets that Adam Smith's invisible 
hand is able to convert into public virtues. It is therefore not surprising that competition 
policy varies from country to country and over time. It is also expected that competition 
policy will be the result of forces different from the simple objective of promoting 
efficiency. In this field, political economy explanations could be as important for 
understanding public policy debates as economic arguments. 
It is in that relativistic context that I shall present some illustrations of the European 
policy towards· cartels and mergers. Through them, we shall see to what extent old and 
new economic criteria derived from Industrial Organisation are utilized. Before that, a 
brief presentation of various objectives of competition policy will highlight the fact that 
the search of allocative efficiency is not the only criterion. 

II. I. Goals of competition policy 
Three main goals can be distinguished. The first one is the diffusion of private economic 
power, the protection of individual freedom and individual rights. Monopolies and 
cartels can then be seen as a radical departure from such individualism. It is in the light 
of these "non-economic values" that E. Mestmacker (1980) has characterized the attitude 
adopted by the German authorities with respect to cartels before World War II. "The 
Nazis", he wrote, "had shown how to transform a highly concentrated and cartelized 
economy irito a central planning system ... Boycotts and collective discrimination were 
applied against outsiders in order to discipline them in the public interest. If the more 
traditional measures of economic coercion proved insufficient for the purpose, even the 
formal transformation of private cartels into compulsory cartels was provided for after 
1933" (p. 388). Mestmacker adds that acceptance of cartels was not limited to 
conservatives who cherished them as safeguards against the anarchy of free competition. 
Marxists also looked upon cartels and concentration as forerunners of rational socialist 
planning. He quotes Hilferding, who interpreted this development as tending towards "a 
universal cartel, that is a rationally regulated society"! 
Conversely, the criterion of a diffusion of private economic power was originally basic to 
antitrust legislation and still occupies an important place, although perhaps more at the 
level of public opinion than at policy level. 
A second goal of competition policy distinct from a search of efficiency may be to protect 
the economic freedom of market competitors. Here the protection of competitors takes 
precedence over the defence of the competitive process as such. Attention is directed 
towards abusive practices such as coercion, discrimination, refusal to sell, boycotts, and 
cartels through which powerful firms. might endanger the existence of weaker 
competitors. This type of approach is particularly in evidence in the national laws 
regarding "unfair competition". According to the Paris Convention of 1883, unfair 
competition is "any act of competition contrary to honest practices in industrial or 
commercial matters". The corresponding laws are intended to ensure that the competitors 
compete.in a fair way, and carry out their social functions according to an ethical code of 
conduct. The standard of business ethics plays an important role in developing such a 
code of honest trade practices, but it is ultimately determined by the common sense of the 
courts. 
The third type of compettt10n policy goal is dear to the hearts of economists. 
Competition policy is one of the main instruments to ensure consumer welfare through 
both allocative and productive efficiency. One of the neatest affirmations of a purely 
efficiency-directed competition policy has been made by R. Bork (1967). According to 
his view, antitrust law must challenge inefficient conduct. A necessary (but not 
sufficient) attribute of inefficiency is a restriction of output beyond levels which would 
prevail under competitive conditions. Conduct not so identified must be presumed to 
enhance efficiency, and should nofbe the subject oflegal sanction. 
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However, new research in industrial organization has shown that simple formulas for 
efficiency defined as net aggregate economic welfare (consumer surplus + producer 
surplus), appear to be deceptive and misleading. According to J. Tirole (1989), the 
theoretical foundations provided by game theory "led many economists to reject the 
simplistic Chicago view of the world (based on perfect information) that price cuts are 
always natural responses to cost and demand shocks or to increased competitive pressure" 
(p. 3 80). More generally, with the various types of non-price competition, consumer 
welfare becomes more multi-dimensional and includes aspects such as the quality of the 
product, the speed and security of the supply and so on. Most of these aspects are not 
measurable and value judgments are necessary. An example is whether allocating a· 
gr.eater amount of resources to activities which result in technological change or product 
variation than would be allocated under a more "classical" form of competition 
contributes enough to consumer welfare to outweigh the possible losses resulting from 
static inefficiencies. On the whole, a precise definition of the "efficiency" criterion is 
more apparent than real and most of the time requires a delicate appreciation of complex 
trade-offs. 
Three principles seem to have inspired the European authorjties in this matter. 
Although EC competition law encompasses many policy objectives and values, including 
distributive concerns, European authorities seem to have adopted the view that the rules 
of competition were not formulated to give protection to individual competitors but to 
uphold the competitive process. In its First Report on Competition Policy ( 1972), the 
Commission wrote : 
Competition is the be.st stimulant of economic activity since it guarantees the 
widest possible freedom of action to all. An active competition policy makes it 
easier for the supply and demand structures continually to adjust to 
technological development. Through the interplay of decentralized 
decision-making machinery, competition enables enterprises continuously to 
improve their efficiency which is the sine qua non for a steady improvement in 
living standards. Such a policy encourages the best possible use of productive 
resources for the greatest possible benefit of the economy as a whole and for 
the benefit, in particular, of the consumer. 
Secondly, the idea is not to strive for the realisation of perfect competition but to promote 
a "workable competition", that is a process of rivalry under conditions of uncertainty that 
achieves a more efficient allocation of resources. This would ensure mobility of 
resources, the provision of alternative choices for producers and consumers and the use of 
the best economic practices in production and distribution. 
"Workable competition" does not have the same solid theoretical foundations as 
perfect-competition theory and implies a value judgement from the political authorities; • 
it simply describes market structures in which new technologies, organisational form:s, 
preferences or products can arise and be developed without public or private restrictions. 
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A third principle is that competlt10n is not the exclusive means of achieving the 
Community's goals. Other instruments may have to be used in situations "when 
competition in itself is not enough to obtain the required results without too much delay 
and intolerable social tension" (First Report on Competition Policy, 1972, p. 17). The 
choice between the alternative policies available, including industrial policy, must be 
based on their relative efficiency. 
Finally, competition policy is viewed as the key instrument to achieve a genuine 
European m·arket without internal frontiers. 
II.2. Concerted practices and parallelism of actions 
Article 85 of the Treaty of Rome states that "agreements between undertakings, decisions 
by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which· may affect trade between 
Member States and which have as their object the prevention, restriction or distortion of 
competition within the Common Market shall be prohibited as incompatible with the 
Common Market". Hence article 85 covers much more than formal cartel arrangements. 
It also embraces concerted practices, "open-price" or information agreements. Such types 
of collusion without formal agreement may be expected to increase when cartel 
agreements are forbidden. The concept of concerted practices emerges most clearly in the 
celebrated Dyestuffs case where manufacturers were accused of price collusion in the 
years 1964-7. 
In 1964, some ten producers sent telexes to their subsidiaries at almost exactly the same . 
time, telling them to raise the prices of particular dyestuffs by a uniform rate of 
14 per cent in Italy and in Benelux. In January 1965, the increase was applied to West 
Germany. 
In August 1967, a meeting of dyestuffs' manufacturers was held in Basel, Switzerland. 
One of them announced his intention of raising prices by 8 per cent in October. The other 
firms reacted by stating that the proposal would be considered. At the end of August, 
Geigy informed its agents and customers in several countries that prices would be raised. 
Other companies followed in September. 
The accused companies defended themselves by stating that the parallel action was not 
concerted, but was based on the compelling force of the prevailing oligopolistic situation. 
In other words, the argument was that the companies could not have behaved otherwise 
because of the structure of the market. The defence also claimed that a firm which 
abstain~d from raising its prices could not have improved its market position because its 
competitors would have withdrawn their announced increases, and the profitability of all 
would have been impaired. 
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However, both the Commission and the Court pointed out that concertation of action had 
been in evidence: in 1964, telex messages in similar terms had stipulated equal price 
increases at exactly the same time. In 1965, and again in 1967, the facts belied the 
manufacturers' contention, and indicated gradual progressive co-operation between the 
firms concerned. With regard to the contention that an oligopolistic market structure 
compels firms to behave similarly, the response was that in the dynamic and uncertain 
conditions of real markets, this is not at all obviously true. In the Dyestuffs case there 
were several factors promoting . intermittently competitive behavior, such as the 
interchangeability of the standard colours, the different cost structure of manufacturers 
and the growing over-all demand for dyestuffs. 
Since that first case, there has been a proliferation of similar situations where the 
Commission and the Court have had to distinguish between conscious parallelism of 
actions and concerted practices. 
Simultaneously, game-theoretic contributions have made clear that collusive equilibria 
can be obtained without cooperation and direct communication: firms may only 
intelligently react to the actions of their competitors. 
The central concept is the "Nash equilibrium" from which nobody has an interest to 
deviate because all players have adopted their best replies. 
In the context of non-cooperative repeated games, where firms never meet to 
communicate their strategies or to correlate their moves, it appears that a "pacifist" 
attitude could lead everybody to more profitable equilibria than a aggressive one. 
This was already the intuition of E. Chamberlin (1933) when he wrote: "since the result 
of a cut by any one is inevitably to decrease his own profits, no one will cut and, although 
the sellers are entirely independent, the equilibrium result is the same as though there 
were a monopolistic agreement between them". 
In recent years, the literature on the subject has been immense.2 It has improved the 
identification of the structural factors that could hinder a collusive outcome that does not 
result from anticompetitive behaviour, such as a lack of market transparency, assymetrics 
among firms, dispersion of demand. 
2 For surveys, see C. Shapiro, 1989, A. Jacquemin and Slade, 1989 and, more recently, J. Baker, 1993 
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Simultaneously, many economists have attempted to measure equilibrium outcomes in 
markets that might be susceptible to tacit collusion. In these econometric studies, firm 
and industry conduct are viewed as unknown parameters to be estimated. For example, 
M. Slade (1987) has used daily time-series data on retail gasoline prices, sales, and unit 
costs, in a context of a price war. Demand, reaction function, and cost functions have 
been estimated. She was then able to test for tacit collusion and found support for profits 
higher than those implied by Nash behaviour in the one-shot game. ~ore generally, the 
recent econometric studies of market power in single markets suggest that there is a great 
deal of market power in the sense of price-cost margins in concentrated industries (see 
Bresnahan, 1989). 
As mentioned in the first part of this paper, game literature on the theory of collusion has 
an embarrassment of richness, given the large range of possible collusive outcomes.3 
Consequently, it is difficult to select from such a vast multiplicity of equilibria. 
Furthermore, ·the results are sensitive to the conditions of information. For example, the 
distinction between collusion in homogeneous goods market and heterogeneous goods 
markets is not confirmed by the theory: even large diversity between firms in some 
dimension may not be an impediment to achieving collusion. Heterogeneity among firms 
may, however, become an impediment to collusion when there is asymmetric information 
among firms about this heterogeneity.4 For example, firms may have private information 
about their own costs, which is unobservable for competitors. In this case, it becomes a 
problem for firms to efficiently design cartel quotas. 
At the empirical level, similar questions emerge. As an example, R. Porter ( 1983 ), in his 
study of the US railroad cartel in the 1880s, concluded that collusion had led to mark-ups 
consistent with static Cournot competition. However, G. Ellison (1994), working on the 
same data set and using a more careful model of the stoch~stic process driving demand, 
obtains the conclusion that prices were close to perfect collusion (quoted by K.V. Kuhn 
and X. Vives, 1994). 
In spite of these uncertainties about the robustness of the theoretical models and the 
enormous difficulties of obtaining the relevant statistical evidences, the European Court 
and the Commission are increasingly open to new economic analyses. 
3 According to a "Folk theorem", under general conditions, repetition of any individually rationale outcome 
in the stage game can be supported as a supergame equilibrium with sufficiently little discounting. 
4 Another important aspect is the asymmetric information between the antitrust authorities and the firms 
which have the relevant data on costs and consumer demand (principal-agent relationship). See 
D. Besanko and D. Spulber (1989), who consider the optimal design of antitrust policy when collusive 
behaviour is unobservable and production costs are private information. See also H. Smets and P. van 
Cayseele ( 1995) who explore the best division of competence between national and supranational antitrust 
authorities, when these authorities are affected by asymmetric information. 
' 21 
The Wood Pulp case illustrates such a move. According to the Judgment of the European 
Court (31 March 1993), "since the Commission has no documents which directly 
establish the existence of concertation between the producers concerned, it is necessary 
to ascertain whether the system of quarterly price announcements, the simultaneity or 
near-simultaneity of the price announcements and the parallelism of price 
announcements as found during the period from 1975 to 1981 constitute a firm, precise 
and consistent body of evidence of prior concertation ... It is necessary to bear in mind 
that, although Article 85 of the Treaty prohibits any form of collusion which distorts 
competition,· it does not deprive economic operators of the right to adapt themselves 
intelligently to the existing and anticipated conduct of their competitors". 
The conclusions of the Court are clear: "It must be stated that, in this case, concertation 
is not the only plausible explanation for the parallel conduct. 5 To begin with, the system 
of price announcements may be regarded as constituting a rational response to the fact 
that the pulp market constituted a long-term market and to the. need felt by both buyers 
and sellers to limit commercial risks. Further, the similarity in the dates of price 
announcements may be regarded as a direct result of the high degree of market 
transparency, which does not have to be described as artificial. Finally, the parallelism 
of prices and the price trends may be satisfactorily explained by the oligopolistic 
tendencies of the market and by the specific circumstances prevailing in certain periods. 
Accordingly, the parallel conduct established by the Commission does not constitute 
evidence of concertation. In the absence of a firm, precise and consistent body of 
evidence, it must be held that concertation regarding announced prices has not been 
established by the Commission. 
Without referring specifically to the concept of Nash equilibrium, which was invoked by 
the defense and by the Advocate-General, the European Court, for the first time, has in 
fact utilized it. 
In a very interesting comment, K.U. Kiihn and X. Vives (1994), agree with the fact that, 
if information exchange would not raise the possibility of price fixing, it is hard to make a 
good economic case against it. But they argue that information exchange can be an 
independent infringement of Article 85(1). Their argument is based on the fact that the 
knowledge of industry characteristics required by the models to prove the existence of a 
tacit collusion are usually not available. For example, it is almost impossible to verify the 
type of demand and cost uncertainty that firms face in a particular industry. 
5 In fact, in competitive markets with homogeneous products, equilibrium prices must be uniform, in spite of 
different costs. Similarly, differences in price elasticities across regions lead to less price discrimination in 
case of competition than with collusion. 
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In order to overcome these difficulties, the authors suggest forbidding as such some forms 
of information sharing, such as direct private information sharing on prices among 
producing firms, that facilitate the establishment of tacit collusion. This is in line with 
the new approach in industrial organization, according to which market conduct can 
transform market structure in order to reduce competition and make easier collusion. It 
also reflects the fact that given the complexities of the recent economic research in the 
field of tacit collusion, a pragmatic approach based on typologies can be useful._ 
11.3. Cooperative R&D and cartels 
According to Article 85 para. 3 of the Rome Treaty, some collusive behaviour restricting 
competition in a non minor way may be exempted because of sufficient beneficial 
effects. Four conditions are required : 
(a) the agreement must contribute to the improvement of the production or distribution 
of goods or promote technical or economic progress; 
(b) it must allow ultimate buyers a fair share of the resulting benefits; 
( c) the restriction must be necessary for the attainment of the objective; 
( d) the firms concerned must be unable to eliminate competition with respect to a 
substantial part of the product in question. 
What Williamson (1977) calls a "naive trade-off model" is a good way of illustrating 
these conditions. This model indicates that, in order to appreciate whether the cartel can 
benefit from· the ·"efficiency defence", it is sufficient to compare the surface 
corresponding to the "deadweight loss", i.e. the loss of consumer welfare created by the 
cartel, and the surface corresponding to its savings in resources which become available 
for alternative use. 
This "naive" static partial equilibrium model, with its cost-benefit analysis limited to 
two-dimensional terms requires a number of qualifications which strongly reduce its 
operationality. These qualifications include matters of timing, non-price competition, X-
inefficiency, response of firms non-participating to the cartel and income distribution 
effects. What is in fact suggested by such a model is the difficulty of identifying 
precisely the efficiency consequences of business conduct and of advocating fine-tuned 
optimal antitrust roles. The conditions of article 85 para. 3 cannot rely on a strict welfare 
analysis and will often require compromise between conflicting and incommensurable 
values. 
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One way which has been used to reduce the burden of the trade-off is to implement 
Article 85 para.3, not so much on a case by case basis, but by granting group (or block) 
exemptions dealing with important types of agreements for which there exists a 
presumption that a situation of market failure can occur. 
This system of exempting certain classes of agreements from the notification 
requirement avoids the necessity of a detailed analysis of each conduct. It creates codes 
of conduct that can increase the credibility of the policy and limit the discretionary power 
involved in the Article. At the same time, it preserves the Article's valuable message that 
antitrust policy must be sensitive to economies and that in some circumstances 
cooperative behaviour can restrict competition in a non-negligible way and still produce 
socially desirable results. 
A clear illustration is the block exemption regulation of R&D agreements, which came 
into force in March 1985. To appreciate its content, it is necessary to examine in some 
depth the role of cooperative R&D. 
The main arguments in favour of socially beneficial effects of cooperative research is 
based on a problem of market failure, bound to the appropriability of returns. The 
starting point is that the amount of research made by private firms and the diffusion of 
the knowledge generated by them may be socially inefficient over a broad range of 
market structure including competition. Two situations can be distinguished. 
Assume first that there are no spillovers or externalities so that each firm's R&D 
influences only its own costs. Nevertheless, as long as firms in the pre-innovation 
market would not expect a perfect discriminating monopoly in the post-innovation 
market, appropriation of the entire social value from innovation will not be expected. 
Even the pre-innovation monopolist would not generally invest the socially optimal 
amount in R&D. 
Now suppose that there are substantial R&D externalities or spillovers : the benefits of 
each firm's R&D flow without payment to other firms. This leads to underinvestment in 
R&D relative to the social optimum and to a structure of knowledge supply which is 
determined by the different degrees of appropriability of the various types. Incentives to 
innovate will also be reduced as the potential innovator knows that competitors will be 
freely strengthened by its own R&D investments. Some estimates of these positive 
externalities on other firms and industries put the social return on R&D at 20% to 25%, 
whereas the internal return is no more than 10% to 12% (A. Torre, 1990). The 
externalities have a geographical dimension too. D. Coe and H. Helpman (1993) 
conclude from a wide-ranging econometric survey that about a quarter of the benefits of 
R&D investment in the seven largest economies (the G-7) are appropriated by their 
trading partners. 
It can then be argued that cooperative R&D can alleviate the following trade off. The 
incentives of a firm to do R&D requires a sufficient degree of appropriability of the 
benefits, and thus a limited diffusion of knowledge; but on the other hand a near-perfect 
appropriability (whether created by circumstances or policy) impedes spillovers of the 
results of R&D to other firms, at no-cost, and hence does not allow a sufficient decrease 
in aggregate R&D costs. 
Cooperative R&D can then be viewed as a means of simultaneously internalizing the 
externalities created by significant R&D spillovers - hence improving the incentive 
problem and providing a more efficient sharing of information among firms. 
D'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) have used a model to study the impact of R&D 
spillovers on a firm's optimal R&D investment. In comparing the symmetric cooperative 
and non-cooperative solutions, they find that large spillovers lead to higher R&D 
expenditures and production levels under the cooperative scenario: this behaviour is 
superior from a social welfare point ofview.6 
Contrasting with these potential advantages of cooperative R&D, effects leading to a 
harmful reduction of competition must also be considered. 
First, let us assume that it is feasible to limit the extent of the agreement solely to aspects 
of R&D and to exclude coordination at the level of the final product (pre-competitive 
level). The dangers of anticompetitive consequences are then strongly reduced. Still, 
one danger is that cooperative R&D could be a way for a dominant firm to avoid 
competition through innovation, by co-opting potentially very innovative rivals and by 
controlling and slowing down the innovation race (Reinganum, 1983). Coordinating the 
R&D process so as to avoid duplication can reduce initiative and lead to inflexibility and 
to waste in dead-end research, when multiple, not perfectly correlated research strategies 
could have been feasible. At the other extreme, incumbent firms with market power can,. 
through concerted pre-emptive operations, excessively accelerate their programmes of 
R&D and innovation in order to exercise a dissuasive impact of potential entrants 
(Gilbert and Newbery, 1982). 
6 These results have been generalized. For references, see d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1990). 
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A second situation involves an extended collusion between partners, resulting from their 
action in R&D and creating common policies at the product stage (competitive level). 
Discussions about R&D can for example spill over into illegal discussions on pricing 
policy. Cooperative R&D can also provide a ready mechanism for side payments in the 
sense that it is useful for cartel members to redistribute the revenues earned by the firms 
as a result of product market division. What makes these dangers probable is again the 
difficulty of appropriating technological breakthroughs. Partners who have achieved 
inventions want to control the processes and products which embody the results of their 
collaboration, in order to recuperate jointly, and as quickly as possible, their R&D 
investments. If the firms are prevented from such a joint exploitation and if the benefits 
of cooperative R&D are expected to be very quickly dissipated through intense product 
market competition, firms will be tempted either to avoid R&D cooperation and to 
maintain wasteful competition in the pre-innovation market or to use their cooperation to 
limit unduly their R&D. If this is true, a regulation of R&D cooperation excluding any 
cooperation at the level of the final markets could discourage or destabilize many 
valuable agreements. However, allowing an extension of cooperation from R&D to 
manufacturing and distribution encourages collusive behaviour which impedes 
competition. 
Again, we may conclude that the models produced by the new Industrial Organisation in 
this domain have improved the quality and the relevance of our analysis. Nevertheless, 
simultaneously, they have made the dilemma faced by the Antitrust Authorities more 
complex. 
The text of the European Regulation 418/85 expresses the compromise that has been 
adopted.· It covers joint research and development of products or processes and joint 
exploitation of the results of that R&D. 
Art. 1 (2)( d) specifies that "exploitation of the results" means the manufacture of the joint 
venture product or the licensing of intellectual property rights to third parties. However 
joint marketing is not covered. An exemption could still have been obtained on the basis 
of Article 85 para. 3, following a notification. In 1990, the Commission granted such an 
exemption to the cooperation agreement on the research, development, production and 
marketing of certain electronic components for satellites, concluded by Alcatel (France), 
the second largest world manufacturer of communication equipment and systems, and 
ANT, one of the leading companies in Germany in the field of telecommunications (see 
EC Commission, XXth Report on Competition Policy, 1991 ). · 
One of the arguments was that, in the particular field of satellites, the nature of demand 
means that the benefits of joint R&D and manufacturing can be obtained only if they are 
combined with some joint marketing. Finally, in 1993 (Regulation n° 151193, OJ 
n°L021, 29/01/93), the 1985 Regulation was amended so as to extend cover to joint 
distribution of specialized products or products resulting from joint research and 
development. 
However, various conditions limit the exemptions. 
By imposing conditions concerning the duration of the venture and the importance of the 
market share, the regulation aims to prevent agreements that might result in the 
elimination of competition in the relevant market. If the joint venture is of the 
conglomeral or vertical type, i.e. if the participants do not compete on the relevant 
product market, the exemption applies for five years, regardless of market share. If the 
joint venture is of the horizontal type, the exemption also applies for five years, but only 
if the parties' combined share of the relevant product market does not exceed 20%. A 
comprehensive list of permissible clauses (the so-called white list) and prohibited (the 
so-called black list) is also included. 
The main aspect of the Regulation is that the European authorities, confronted with the 
above dilemma, take into account the factors identified by economic analysis but adopt a 
pragmatic approach. They consider that cooperation in R&D, in many cases, cannot be 
limited to the sole level of pure R&D, and that it will generally lead to joint exploitation 
of the results in order to stabilize the agreements and to solve the appropriability 
problem. A priori, this approach has not a strong economic- foundation given that 
external effects are more likely in basic, upstream research. But this could be challenged 
if one implies that R&D is an endogenised process, responding to the pressures of end 
users. Today this "non-linear" view of the innovation process exercises growing 
influence on the European R&D policy (see the Green Paper on Innovation, 20/12/95). 
11.4 Mergers and efficiency defence 
Many economists give weight to the arguments that mergers and acquisitions are able to 
enhance efficiency by exploiting economies of scale and scope, learning economies, and 
also by improving the efficiency of management through the market for corporate control. 
However, the empirical evidence for this view is not strong. Coley and Reinton (1988) 
looked at U.S. and British companies in the 'Fortune' 250 list and the 'Financial Times' 
500 which in the past had made acquisitions to enter new markets. They conclude that 
only 23% of the 116. firms analysed were able to recover the cost of their capital or, better 
still, the funds invested in the acquisition programme. It also appears that the higher the 
degree of diversification, the smaller the likelihood of success. For horizontal mergers in 
which the acquired firm is not large, however, the success rate is around 45%. The main 
reasons for failure appear to be: too high a price paid for the acquisition, over-estimation 
of the potential of the acquired business in terms of synergies and market position, and 
inadequate management of the. process of integration after the acquisition. 
More generally, there is a striking contrast between ex ante event studies of the corporate 
mergers' potential gains and the ex post evaluations of the effective results. In his 
introduction to a special issue of the International Journal of Industrial Organisation on 
'mergers', Mueller ( 1989) concludes that prior to the mergers the shares of acquiring firms 
tend to outperform the market. At the time of the announcement, there is little change in 
the acquiring firm's share price. The post-acquisition performance of acquiring company 
share prices is below their pre-merger performance, and in many studies below that of the 
market. This post-merger performance matches the constant or declining performance of 
the acquired units measured in profitability, market shares or_ productivity. 'This pattern 
appears to be characteristic of mergers in the United States over at least the last 60 years, 
and probably the last century. It also appears characteristic of mergers in Europe and 
Japan.' 
This suggests that, in many cases, there is no real trade-off between efficiency gains from 
mergers, notably in the form of cost reductions and an increase in monopoly power, 
because in the first place efficiency gains are simply not there. Still there are situations 
where the trade-off can be relevant. 
In that case, the antitrust authority has the task of deciding whether efficiencies outweigh 
the increased risk of collusion. Indeed a horizontal merger reducing the number of 
independent firms permits coordinated use of previously independent productive assets 
(capital, patents, trademarks ... ) and increases concentration in the relevant market. This 
can lead to higher prices. 
At this stage, we again meet the situation created by the development of economic 
analysis. On one hand, industrial organisation economics has improved the criteria and 
the tools that can be used for evaluating the effects of a merger. However, on the other 
hand, the new dimensions to be taken into account are very complex and sensitive, and 
the information that antitrust authorities possesses is generally inadequate to permit a 
full-blown cost-benefit analysis. 
Two important examples, calling into question the "naive" trade-off analysis mentioned 
in the previous section, support that view. 
The first one concerns the static case. J. Farrel and C. Shapiro (1990) provide a model 
where they analyze the output and price effects of a merger among Coumot oligopolists, 
emphasizing the effects on nonparticipant firms. Their main contribution is an 
identification of the role of the response of these nonparticipant firms, to any output 
reduction by the merging parties. If nonparticipating firms reduce their output, the merger 
may well lower welfare even though it is profitable. On the contrary, if nonparticipant 
firms with large mark-ups expand their output noticeably in response to the merger, a 
significant welfare gain can be provided.7 More generally, a merger's effect on total 
welfare is made of three components: the change in joint profits of the merging firms, the 
change in profits of the nonparticipant firms and the change in consumers' surplus. 
Could this notable improvement in the identification of the effects of mergers lead 
automatically to a better merger policy? In their reply to 'a comment by G. Werden 
( 1991 ), the authors ( 1991) adopt a prudent attitude and underline three limitations of their 
analysis: 
"whether or not the Cournot model is helpful for merger policy is very hard to know 
ex ante: clearly the assumptions are false, but it is much less clear whether they are 
false in such important ways that the conclusions are misleading"; 
the analysis "relies heavily on the assumption of homogeneous products"; 
"the Coumot model ignores the possibility of explicit collusion". s 
And they conclude: "it would shock us ... if the Department of Justice and the Federal 
Trade Commission were to decree that, henceforth, proposed mergers should be analyzed 
solely using the Farell-Shapiro model". It remains that their analysis could contribute to a 
better antitrust policy toward mergers. 
7 Let us recall that, in a Coumot equilibrium, large mark-ups are associated with large market shares, and 
large firms have lower marginal costs. 
8 Another limit has been identified by P. Barros and L. Cabral (1994). They analyse the case of an open 
economy where the regulator is only concerned with domestic welfare, i.e. the impact on consumers and 
domestic firms. One of their conclusions is that the criterion proposed by Farrell and Shapiro should not 
be followed "literally" in such a case. 
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A second illustration of the limits of the traditional "trade-off' concerns the dynamic 
effects of a merger. 
J. Ordover and W. Baumol (1988), in their analysis of mergers in high-technology 
industries, conclude that mergers in high-technology industries, in which technologies 
and products are short-lived, should raise fewer concerns than similar mergers in 
industries which have entered their stable phase. This suggestion holds as long as 
high-technology mergers do not combine firms with large shares of substitute R&D assets 
that also require large shares of market specific assets for their effective exploitation. On 
the whole the message here is that, when there is a trade-off between static and dynamic 
efficiency, it is wise to favour the long-run dynamic performance that is expected to 
ultimately overcome any static loss. 
Still, the existence of such a trade-off can be questioned. Some evidence suggests that 
R&D is not characterised by substantial economies of scale and that monopoly power can 
be expected to inhibit R&D and technological advance in the long run. Furthermore, 
avoiding wasteful duplication, internalising external effects and ensuring a large 
dissemination of knowledge could be obtained through less dangerous devices than full 
mergers, such as R&D cooperation at the "precompetitive stage".· What can be 
effectively argued, in the application of merger policy, is that in industries characterised 
by short-lived high-technology and rapidly expanding demand, all other things being 
equal, the prospect of efficiency gains is enhanced and the danger of monopoly power is 
limited. 
It is in that context that we shall look at the European Regulation of mergers. The 
absence of such a control provision was, for a long period, a major gap in EC competition 
policy. The Commission finally succeeded in getting the Council of Ministers to adopt a 
Regulation in December 1989. It applies. to mergers having a Community dimension as 
defined by a combination of criteria relating to total turnover and geographical 
distribution of turnover within the Community - aggregate worldwide turnover must 
exceed Ecu 5.000 million, and aggregate EC turnover of each of at least two firms has to 
exceed Ecu 250 million. 
As we have seen, considerations of efficiency are expected to enter into merger appraisal. 
For example, under the 1984 revision of the US Guidelines, mergers likely to raise prices 
will be permitted if the parties can demonstrate by "clear and convincing evidence" that 
the merger is "reasonably necessary" to create significant cost savings or other efficiency 
benefits. 
In contrast, the European Regulation has adopted a strict approach: the wording suggests 
that the regulation contains no defence similar to the one stated in Article 85 par. 3 for 
cartels, and that effective competition is the only reference. The wording also implies 
that only the consumers' surplus, and not the producers' surplus, is retained: apparently 
some sacrifice of consumer interest for the sake of higher profits is not accepted. 9 
It is hard to believe that in practice such a strict policy will be fully implemented and that 
the role of potential efficiency gains will be ignored. · 
In fact, the danger is that instead of an explicit cost-benefit analysis, surreptitious 
compromises would be sought within the Commission. This already appears in the first 
negative decision taken by the Commission. In that case, it prohibited the acquisition of 
de Havilland, a Canadian subsidiary of Boeing, by Aerospatiale of France and Alenia of 
Italy. The Commission argued mainly that the merger would have given de Havilland and 
ATR (the Franco-Italian joint venture) 50 percent of the world market and 67 percent of 
the EC market for commuter aircraft with 20 to 70 seats. This would have created a 
dominant position, affecting even the largest producers (such as British Aerospace and 
Fokker), with no competition from the United States or Japan. Whatever its specific 
merits and problems (especially the definition of the relevant market), it can be argued 
that this decision is important : even in a "special" sector such as aerospace, the 
Commission seems to stick to the principle that mergers and takeovers should be judged 
purely on competitive grounds. 
However, there are some ambiguities about the role of economies in the decision. Having 
established .that the ATR/de Havilland merger would lead to a reduction in competition, 
the Commission states: "without prejudice as to whether cost saving consideration are 
relevant for the ·assessments under article 2 of the Merger regulation, such cost savings 
would have a negligible impact on the -overall operations of the ATR/de Havilland, 
amounting to around 0.5% of the combined turnover". According to Jenny ( 1992), "this 
decision offers some solace to the economists in that, although the Commission refuses to 
say explicitly whether productive efficiency gains are relevant for considering whether or 
not a merger is compatible with the common market, it nevertheless does discuss the 
importance of the manufacturing cost reductions alleged by the parties in a way that, at 
least implicitly, suggests that productive efficiency gains must be compared to the 
potential losses of consumer surplus due to the increase in concentration brought about by 
the merger." (p. 95). 
9 Assuming that a merger must be profitable for the firms that are willing to be part of it, this implies that an 
increase of the sum of the consumers' surplus and profits by firms not participating is not a sufficient 
condition for allowing a merger. 
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In another decision on the acquisition of NCR (a computer manufacturer) by ATT 
(January 1991), the Commission seems to go further and argue that the merger could have 
been illegal because it would yield economies, and hence create or strengthen a dominant 
position. Its conclusion was that the potential advantages which A TT hopes to gain from 
this concentration are for the moment theoretical and have yet to be proved in a future 
market place. This suggests that had the Commission believed that the merger was likely 
to contribute to economic progress, it would have considered opposing it. 
An implication of such a situation is that a strict and apparently rigorous approach 
emphasising the preservation of effective competition could lead to perverse effects 
according to wh.ich subreptice compromises between competition policy and industrial 
policy are made (see P. Buigues, A. Jacquemin and A. Sapir, 1995). 
Conclusion 
The complexity of human behaviour is especially evident in the world of economics and · 
corporate strategies. In this domain, simple mechanic laws and repetitive processes lose 
part of their relevance as a result of strategies that transform and manipulate the existing 
environment. Productive and organisational structures are not simply the outcome of 
some sort of natural necessity. They result largely from deliberate choices. 
In this context, Industrial Organisation economics has, over time, elaborated important 
concepts, models and typologies that reveal the richness of corporate conducts .. 
Simultaneously, however, it is far from an exact science, arid its results remain fragile. 
Implications for the regulators, and more specifically the Antitrust Authorities, are 
ambiguous. On the one hand, they can rely on the new theoretical and empirical 
analyses, to the extent that they identify more and more effectively the diverse 
characteristics of our real industry economy. On the other hand, the very limited 
information at the disposal of these Authorities and the difficulty in coping with complex 
tradeoffs, especially for the Court, constrain the effective use of the new knowledge. 
Our illustrations of the European policy towards concerted practices, cooperative R&D 
and mergers have shown how the Commission and the Court are trying more and more to 
adopt a workable approach, combining "science" and pragmatism, relying on 
presumptions and shortcuts that reflect current economic knowledge and belief. 
An important implication of this approach is that the "experts" involved in a case are 
.expected to be modest. As R. Schmalensee ( 1987) wrote, "economists cannot testify with 
the confidence of experts on ballistics and fingerprints. ", and, we may add, even if they 
are very well paid. 
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